A Roadmap to Saving Darfur (January 20, 2007)
After four years of explicit genocide in Darfur, the world finally seems to be turning their attention to this war-torn region in Western Sudan. Although seemingly hopeless, there is a way, a map to end this crisis. A generation does not have to grow-up behind the barriers of refugee camps, but should be able to make the trip home, escorted by the international community, and welcomed by their own government.
Human nature often leads us to view the world through a lens of good and evil. In world conflict we often apply this method to simplify issues. By identifying who are the "good guys" and who are the "bad guys" we make the process of choosing sides less complicated. As witnessed in the current crisis in Darfur, reality is much more nuanced and complex than this superhero model.
As is the case in most major conflicts, almost all relevant parties in Darfur have blood on their hands. This is not meant to equate the atrocities conducted by the Government of Sudan and its proxy executers to that of the local rebel groups. However, in order to negotiate a peace-agreement we must acknowledge all wrongdoings regardless of allegiance. It is true that the Sudanese Government supports the Janjaweed's efforts to destroy the civilian population in Darfur. But, it is also true that the Darfurian rebel factions also commit crimes such as rape and the destruction of property.
The crisis in Darfur consists of two elements. The first is genocide, and second is the local tribal conflict. The genocide is the systemic targeting of the civilian population in Darfur by the armed, trained, and government-supported militias - the Janjaweed. This genocide can be stopped. More importantly, it must be stopped. The local tribal conflict has been ongoing for many years. Tensions over access to basic resources, such as water and food, created feuding between nomadic tribes and villagers.
Ending the violence in Darfur will take several steps, all of which require intense diplomatic intervention by the United Nations and the African Union special envoys supported by the United States and the greater international community.
We have lost the luxury of time in this fight. With the failure of the United States and other entities to apply punitive measures, such as targeted sanctions, upon the government in Khartoum, the genocide has been allowed to continue, without international intervention. Advocacy-based attempts have been unsuccessful in pressuring the Bush Administration to put significant diplomatic pressure upon the Sudanese. As a matter of life and death, while advocacy for punitive measures must insist, it is time to expand efforts and utilize other resources in ending this conflict as well.
Successful negotiations between the government and rebel leaders first and foremost, require a cease-fire. This time will allow for efforts to be focused upon political preparations by all stakeholders. The rebel leaders needs time to develop a unified voice, and the Sudanese government needs time to engage in dialogue with the international community. A table needs at least three legs in order to stand. International parties such as the United States, the United Nations and the African Union, can provide the ultimate stability to reinforce a table for peace.
Fragmentation of rebel groups followed the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May of 2006. Upon meeting some of the rebel leaders, the consequences became clear. Rebel leaders are often just very young men with guns. General Mohammed Basher of the Justice and Equality rebel group and Colonel Abdul Abdallah Ismail of the Non-Signatory Front are only able to explain in general terms their political objectives. "What is it that you need in order to sign a peace agreement?" we asked them. Their answers were a collection of non-specific clichés. It seems as if their intimidating guns are an addictive source of power for them.
Before any political process can take place in Sudan, the Darfur rebel leaders must be allowed to meet, unify, and create a unified political agenda. Ironically, the Sudanese government must allow its enemies to strengthen and coalesce in order to have a viable partner at the table.
Nevertheless, as far as the rebels are concerned the pillars on which a political settlement must be built are:
• Disarming the Janjaweeds,
• The safe return of refugees and internally displaced people to their homes,
• Financial compensation, and
• A seat around the table - i.e. power sharing.
Understanding the mindset and calculations of the Sudanese Government, one must try to see the reality that President Omar Hassan Al Bashir sees. Bashir believes that the international community led by the United States is trying to break apart Sudan. This perception is based on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement brokered in Southern Sudan in January of 2005, which opened the door to a Southern cessation from Sudan. "We cannot go the path of the South-North agreement," Bashir told us.
President Bashir is also convinced that the United States' goal involves a regime change. The newscasts from Iraq and Saddam Hussein's execution reinforced his suspicion and instilled fear. Lastly, President Bashir believes that the insistence on an international force is aimed at snatching Sudanese leaders from their seat of power and exporting them to the Hague for trial. Regardless of whether the President's perceptions are right, they are, in his eyes, reality.
As much as Bashir is concerned, a political solution to the Darfur crisis must include the following spoken and un-spoken pillars:
• Maintaining the territorial integrity of Sudan;
• Political guarantees against a regime change policy;
• "Get out of Jail Free Card" to be used by government and militia leaders with the International Criminal Court; and,
• Lifting of sanctions and normalization of relations with the West.
Negotiating with the Sudanese Government on these needs and wants should precede negotiations between the government and the rebels. Implementation of any agreed upon package will naturally be conditioned to the successful negotiations and implementation of a settlement in Darfur.
The first step is therefore to obtain a cease-fire and a period of political preparations by all parties.
The second step is initiating and bringing negotiations between the rebel groups and the Government of Sudan to a successful conclusion.
Even a rapid look on the above sets of pillars reveals quite an interesting fact: there are no clear contradictions between the needs of the Sudanese Government and those of the rebels. Yes, compromises are needed on both ends; but this is not a zero-sum game, a settlement can and should be reached.
If anyone thinks that we can bring an end to the crisis in Darfur solely by pressuring the Sudanese Government and not the rebel groups to enter the political process, they are fooled. In speaking to rebel leaders, relief workers and victims of violence in Darfur, it is abundantly clear that the rebels must play an equal part in the resolution of this conflict.
Yes - we must take every measure possible to compel the Sudanese Government to agree to a political settlement. But at the same time we must also pressure leaders of the rebel groups to do the same. If we only pressure the government, what motive will the rebels have to join the process? In their eyes, as long as the war continues, pressure on the government projects the fact that they are winning.
The two sides cannot reach an agreement on their own. Bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion will take careful oversight, hand-holding and some serious pushing by the African Union and United Nations' special envoys, Salim Salim and Jan Eliasson, as well as the African Union Force Commander, Luke Aprezi and the United States Ambassador Cameron Hume.
Once there is a peace to keep, the third step is revamping and establishing a capable African Union/United Nations hybrid peacekeeping force to guarantee implementation of the negotiated agreement. Most of the framework for this force has already been agreed upon in Addis Ababa in November of 2006. Despite logistical difficulties it is possible to prepare such a coalition for deployment in the region.
Two added elements might make this task a little easier and more productive. First, a Chinese contingency in the force will be difficult for President Bashir to reject or sabotage. The political and economic alliance between China and Sudan secures accountability on the part of the Sudanese Government. Furthermore, President Bashir has developed a unique trust with China. The challenge is to compel the Chinese to get involved.
The second element is defining the hybrid force as a bi-national rather than a Sudanese mission. Arms flow into Darfur from two main sources - Khartoum and N'Djamena, Chad. Mandating the hybrid force on both sides of the Sudan-Chad border will prevent the flow of arms and maintain the territorial integrity of both nations. In addition, a bi-national mission will defuse much of the Sudanese resentment toward this force and will allow internationalizing the force beyond the already over-stretched African Union. Chad is likely to welcome such a mission as it fears the flow of arms into Chad from Sudan and is suspicious of Sudanese backing of Chadian rebel groups.
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In his mission to Sudan, earlier this month, Governor Richardson paved this road map for a political settlement in Darfur. The joint statement on January 10 th , 2007, with President Bashir established a clear path. The plan developed during three days of meetings garnered universal support from President Bashir and the Government of Sudan, leaders of the non-signatory rebel fractions, the African Union Force Commander, and the United Nations and African Union special envoys. It was also supported by the American Ambassador to Sudan.
The challenge is implementation and follow-through. All of the above players must focus their efforts and leverage to implement this road-map. The Save Darfur Coalition can play an important role in this process. As it happens, the success of the Coalition's public campaign is hurting Khartoum. This success gave the Save Darfur Coalition significant leverage over the Government of Sudan and can therefore play a role in oversight and reporting of compliance and non-compliance of commitments by all parties.
Ending the violence in Darfur is within reach.